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ONE LAST SHOT AT THE BYRD: SKF USA, INC. V.
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION SHOULD
NOT FORECLOSE AS-APPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE BYRD AMENDMENT
Jessica M. Forton+
Upon signing into law the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (CDSOA),1 President William J. Clinton cautioned,
[T]his bill will provide select U.S. industries with a subsidy above
and beyond the protection level needed to counteract foreign
subsidies, while providing no comparable subsidy to other U.S.
industries or to U.S. consumers, who are forced to pay higher prices
on industrial inputs or consumer goods as a result of the
anti-dumping and countervailing duties. I call on the Congress to
override this provision, or amend it to be acceptable, before they
adjourn.2
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2006, The Catholic University of America. The author wishes to thank Professor Rhett
Ludwikowski for his invaluable assistance during the writing process. The author would also like
to thank her family and friends for their support, as well as the dedicated staff members of the
Catholic University Law Review for their contributions to this Note.
1. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000),
repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 154–55. This Note
uses various terms particular to international-trade law; thus, it is useful to provide initial
definitions. “Dumping” occurs when a foreign imported product is sold in the United States for
less than the product’s fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2006). An “antidumping duty” is a tax
levied on the product when imported to counter the effects of dumping. See § 1673; BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1593 (9th ed. 2009). A “countervailing duty” is a tax imposed on a foreign
imported product to counter the effects of a foreign government subsidy. See § 1671(a); BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 581. A “subsidy” is a monetary benefit provided by a foreign
government to the producer of the foreign imported product. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra,
at 1565; see also infra Part I.A.1 (providing a more thorough explanation of these terms).
2. Presidential Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2001, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
2669, 2670 (Oct. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Presidential Statement]. The tone of President Clinton’s
statement indicates the suspicious conditions under which CDSOA was enacted. See JEANNE J.
GRIMMETT & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33045, THE CONTINUED DUMPING
AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT (“BYRD AMENDMENT”) 3 (2005) [hereinafter CRS REPORT, BYRD
AMENDMENT]. In previous sessions of Congress, CDSOA legislation had been introduced but
never made it out of committee. Id. Finally, Senator Robert Byrd—in his role as negotiator
during conference negotiations—managed to slip the controversial legislation into the
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2001. Id.; see also 146 CONG. REC. 23,091 (2000) (statement of Sen. John
McCain) (“[W]e should consider the effect of [CDSOA] very carefully. Instead, we will not
consider it at all. No member, except those among the negotiators, will have any say about the

565

566

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:565

CDSOA—colloquially known as the Byrd Amendment3—is an obscure, yet
controversial provision of U.S. international-trade law that has gone farther
than any other remedial trade measure in protecting U.S. domestic industries
against foreign competition.4 Reviled by critics both abroad and at home, the
Byrd Amendment was struck down as a violation of U.S. international legal
commitments,5 and now faces numerous constitutional challenges brought by
adversely affected domestic companies.6 Plaintiffs who have filed suit have
objected to the Byrd Amendment’s “affected domestic producer” provision,
which conditions Byrd-money eligibility on whether the producer supported an
effects of the policy.”). Knowing that Congress and the President would have to reject the entire
Agriculture Appropriations Bill to prevent CDSOA from passing, Senator Byrd helped to enact
his amendment into law. See Michael M. Phillips, Dumping Provision in Bill Puts Clinton at
Odds with Union Voters Gore Needs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2000, at A2 (reporting that the
Clinton Administration “can’t afford to veto the entire agriculture-funding bill” over CDSOA).
3. CDSOA is named after the late Senator Byrd of West Virginia, whose
behind-the-scenes efforts were responsible for the statute’s enactment. See CRS REPORT, BYRD
AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See id. at 2 (“Many find the measure controversial, therefore, because they believe that
it adds a level of ‘protection’ on subject U.S. products in addition to the ameliorative action
afforded by trade remedies.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-979,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING
AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 3 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“CDSOA operates differently
from [other] trade remedies, such as AD/CV duties, which generally provide relief to all
producers in an industry.”). A survey of international-trade attorneys found that cases criticizing
the Byrd Amendment were among the most influential trade cases of the decade because of the
controversy surrounding the Amendment and Congress’s rare decision to repeal the law in
response to a World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling. Ryan Davis, International Trade Cases
of the Decade, LAW 360 (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.law360.com/print_article/141720. The
WTO is an international organization that seeks to liberalize trade by providing a forum for its
member states to negotiate agreements, and also provides a mechanism for settling trade disputes.
WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (2011), available at
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.
5. The WTO dispute, reportedly concerning a record number of co-complainants, involved
eleven WTO members that successfully challenged the legality of the Byrd Amendment. See
Panel Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/R,
WT/DS234/R (Sept. 16, 2002); see also CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 9.
The United States has not yet fully complied with the WTO’s ruling to stop all distributions under
the Byrd Amendment, and, as a result, the WTO authorized both the European Union and Japan
to continue to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports. EU Drastically Shrinks Byrd
Amendment Retaliation to Three Products, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 29, 2011, at 3 (noting that
EU retaliatory tariffs have dropped significantly from $95.83 million in 2010 to $9.96 million in
2011, due to the drop in Byrd distributions); Japan To Extend, Reduce Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S.
Exports in Byrd Fight, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 12, 2011, at 12 (reporting that Japan’s
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports will fall from 4.1 to 1.7 percent in 2011).
6. See, e.g., SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006) (upholding the equal-protection claim of plaintiff domestic producer who was denied
Byrd Amendment distributions), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot.
(SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Second Amended Complaint at 4, Giorgio Foods Inc. v.
United States, No. 03-00286 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 7, 2011) (claiming that the Byrd Amendment
violates the plaintiff domestic producer’s right to free speech).
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antidumping or countervailing-duty order, thus excluding select domestic
producers.7
The United States currently enforces legislation designed to combat
foreign-trade practices that negatively impact its domestic industries.8 Current
domestic laws penalize the most common harmful practices—dumping and
subsidization—by imposing antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD)
orders.9 An antidumping duty is assessed when a foreign product is imported
and sold in the U.S. domestic market for less than its fair value—an occurrence
referred to as dumping.10 A countervailing duty is assessed when a foreign
producer receives monetary benefits—known as subsidies—from its
government and the importation and sale of the subsidized product injures or
threatens to injure the domestic industry.11 Both dumping and subsidization
allow foreign producers to compete unfairly in the U.S. market to the detriment
of domestic industries.12
Members of a domestic industry threatened by dumping or subsidization can
initiate an AD/CVD order by filing a petition with the appropriate government
agencies.13 These agencies review the petition and conduct an investigation to
verify the occurrence of dumping or subsidization, and determine whether the

7. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2000), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 154–55 (2005) (defining an “affected domestic producer” as
any producer that “(A) was a petitioner or interested party in support of the petition with respect
to which an antidumping duty order . . . or a countervailing duty order has been entered, (B) and
remains in operation” (emphasis added)). Support under this provision must be indicated “by
letter or through questionnaire response.” Id. § 1675c(d)(1).
8. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32371, TRADE REMEDIES: A PRIMER 1
(2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES]. American trade laws are generally divided
into two categories: (1) laws designed to combat unfair, or illegal foreign trade practices (e.g.,
dumping, subsidization, or breach of international agreements), and (2) laws designed to combat
the effects of fair or legal foreign trade practices that may nonetheless distort competition and
harm U.S. industries. See id. Measures combating these practices are generally consistent with
U.S. obligations under various international trade agreements. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM
J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
752–53 (5th ed. 2008) (explaining that WTO rules “have always permitted countries to take
actions to offset injury caused by dumped and subsidized goods”).
9. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2006).
10. Id. § 1673; see supra note 1; infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a); see supra note 1; infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
12. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 752 (noting that “the desire to create a level
playing field” drives antidumping and countervailing-duty rules).
13. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(1), 1673a(b)(1). Under U.S. law, the Department of Commerce
(Commerce), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) all play a role in investigating, issuing, and executing an AD/CVD order that allows for the
imposition of duties on an imported product. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 763–66; see also
infra Part I.A.1 (explaining the procedures for filing an AD/CVD petition).
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practices affect a sufficient portion of the domestic industry.14 A positive
determination results in issuance of an AD/CVD order that instructs Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) to collect duties on the product at issue.15
Domestic producers that file or support a successful AD/CVD petition receive
payouts from the imposed duties under the Byrd Amendment.16
Before the Byrd Amendment was enacted, monies collected from these
duties went directly to the U.S. Treasury.17 Although the duties were
substantial, they did not appear to discourage the targeted unfair trade
practices.18 Thus, Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to provide monetary
relief to those domestic producers that suffered harm both before and after the
imposition of an AD/CVD order.19 Proponents of the Byrd Amendment
believed the legislation would strengthen AD/CVD laws and ensure “that the
remedial purpose of those laws [was] achieved.”20 Despite this noble
intention, opponents believe the detrimental effect of the Byrd Amendment on
domestic and foreign trade outweighs any possible benefits.21
14. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(1)–(2), 1673(1)–(2); see also infra Part I.A.2 (providing an
in-depth look at the ITC’s role in an injury assessment and explaining that the ITC determines
which domestic producers are eligible for Byrd money).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (“[D]uties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order [or] an
antidumping duty order . . . shall be distributed on an annual basis . . . to the affected domestic
producers for qualifying expenditures. Such distribution shall be known as the ‘continued
dumping and subsidy offset.’”); see also infra Part I.A.3.b (outlining procedures for obtaining a
payout under the Byrd Amendment).
17. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. Domestic producers only benefited from the
monetary burden imposed on their foreign competition and the expectancy that those foreign
producers would comply with U.S. trade law. See id. at 6–7. Compliance with AD/CVD laws
following an order is generally measured within five years in a “sunset review,” in which
Commerce and the ITC determine whether the harmful practice remains and whether it is still
harming a sufficient scope of the domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2006); see also GAO
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, IMPORT INJURY INVESTIGATIONS CASE
STATISTICS (FY 1980–2008) (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents
/historical_case_stats.pdf (noting that half of 705 AD/CVD orders reviewed between the years
1998–2008 were not revoked).
18. See 146 CONG. REC. 23,117 (2000) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd) (advocating for the
Byrd Amendment and declaring that “[c]urrent law has simply not been strong enough to deter
unfair trading practices”); see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 17, at tbl. 1 (providing
statistical support for the notion that AD/CVD duties alone do not encourage compliance with
AD/CVD laws); infra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining the ineffectiveness of AD/CVD
orders).
19. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X,
§ 1002(3), 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 (2000) (referring to “the continued dumping or
subsidization of imported products after the issuance of” AD/CVD orders).
20. See id. § 1002(5), 114 Stat. at 1549A-73; see also 146 CONG. REC. 23,117 (statement of
Sen. Robert Byrd) (“Now, such a mechanism will be in place . . . [for] workers . . . to recover
monetarily rather than simply having the right to file a complaint.”).
21. See Presidential Statement, supra note 2, at 2670 (recommending that Congress repeal
the Byrd Amendment because it would require consumers to face price increases on goods); Mark
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In the most significant Byrd Amendment challenge to date, SKF USA, Inc.
(SKF USA), a domestic producer of steel ball bearings, contested its
ineligibility for Byrd benefits, while its eligible domestic competitors received
millions in Byrd money.22 In 2006, SKF USA brought suit in the U.S. Court of
International Trade (CIT), which held the Byrd Amendment unconstitutional
because it denied SKF USA equal protection under the law.23 On appeal, a
divided Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed and upheld
the
Byrd
Amendment’s
constitutionality
on
free-speech
and
The Supreme Court subsequently denied
equal-protection grounds.24
certiorari.25 Despite significant factual differences between the SKF plaintiffs
and other Byrd Amendment challengers, the CAFC’s holding will likely
dictate the outcome of future Byrd Amendment challenges.26

R. Ludwikowski, More May Seek Byrd Payments, J. COM., Sept. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.joc.com/more-may-seek-Byrd-payments (explaining how the Byrd Amendment hurts
its intended beneficiaries). A review of key statistics supports the contention that the Byrd
Amendment operates favorably for only a few domestic producers. See GAO REPORT, supra note
4, at 28–29 (noting that Byrd payments are concentrated in a small number of businesses). Byrd
Amendment distributions totaled approximately $1 billion from fiscal years 2001 through 2004;
yet, nearly half of that payment was distributed to only five eligible domestic producers. Id.
Timken, a ball bearings producer, received the largest individual payout—about twenty percent of
the distributions, which totaled near $205 million. Id.
22. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006) (noting that SKF USA’s domestic competitor, Timken U.S. Corporation, named as a
defendant-intervenor, has received millions in Byrd money), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v.
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also supra note 21
(detailing how Timken has received the majority of all payouts under the Byrd Amendment
across all industries).
23. SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. U.S. law bestows the CIT, a specialized federal court,
with jurisdiction to hear all trade-related matters. See 28 U.S.C § 1581 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
24. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360. Decisions of the CIT are directly appealable to the CAFC,
which the Supreme Court can ultimately review. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2006); JACKSON ET
AL., supra note 8, at 120. Byrd Amendment challenges in the CIT have been mostly successful;
however, the CAFC has reversed the majority of these judgments. See, e.g., SKF II, 556 F.3d at
1360; PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2008-1526, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22584, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), rev’d 558 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008).
25. SKF USA, Inc. v. Customs & Border Prot., 130 S. Ct. 3273 (2010). Traditionally, the
Supreme Court has been extremely hesitant to hear trade-related cases, which leaves the CAFC’s
opinions as controlling authority in most of these cases. See Ryan Davis, High Court Takes on
First Anti-Dumping Case, LAW 360 (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.law360.com/web/artciles/75562
(noting that the Supreme Court only recently took on its first dumping case); see also United
States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 308 (2009) (upholding the Commerce Department’s
interpretation of the antidumping statute to treat “low enriched uranium” as a good, rather than a
service, thus subjecting it to duties).
26. See PS Chez Sidney, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22584, at *3 (“SKF . . . control[s] with
regard to all constitutional issues presented . . . .”). Although PS Chez Sidney is marked as
“UNPUBLISHED OR NONPRECEDENTIAL AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT,”
a circuit court may not restrict its citation except to limit its use as persuasive precedent. See id.
at *1; see also FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a).
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Bowing to international and domestic pressures, Congress repealed the Byrd
Amendment in 2006,27 while leaving certain provisions effective for successful
claims made before October 1, 2007.28 Although Congress limited payout
claims to a six-year period from October 2001 to October 2007,29 a claims
backlog has left approximately $1 billion in funds yet to be distributed.30 This
backlog resulted mainly because domestic producers seeking their fair share of
Byrd money brought numerous legal challenges to the Byrd Amendment’s
validity, and these challenges were stayed pending the outcome of SKF and
other test cases.31 Many of the plaintiffs in these cases rely on the argument
that to give only those producers that supported the original petition a
monetary benefit while considering ineligible other producers that have
similarly been affected by the foreign practice, but that did not support the
petition, violates equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.32
Unfortunately, the CAFC’s holding in SKF and the Supreme Court’s

27. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154
(repealing 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000)).
28. Id. § 7601(b).
29. Compare Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X,
§ 1003(c), 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-75 (2000) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply
with respect to all antidumping and countervailing duty assessments made on or after October 1,
2000.”), with Deficit Reduction Act § 7601(b) (“All duties on entries of goods made and filed
before October 1, 2007 . . . shall be distributed.”).
30. Nick Brown, SKF Looks to High Court to Nullify Byrd Amendment, LAW 360 (Feb. 12,
2010), http://www/law360.com/print_article/149488; see also infra notes 60–61 and
accompanying text (describing how potential Byrd payments reached $1 billion).
31. Supreme Court Declines to Review Ruling in Byrd Amendment Case, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 21, 2010, at 10. For a listing of over thirty cases that were stayed pending other
Byrd challenges, see Letter from Gregory W. Carman, Judge, U.S. Court of Int’l Trade, to
Counsel, Consol. Ct. No. 06-00290, et al. (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file with the CIT).
32. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1363, 1366 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006) (holding the Byrd Amendment unconstitutional under an equal-protection analysis),
rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). Claims of equal protection are not a new phenomenon in international-trade law. See
Todd M. Hughes & Claudia Burke, Constitutional Litigation and Its Jurisdictional Implications
in the Court of International Trade, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 541 (2009) (finding that
constitutional issues, including equal-protection challenges, have “played a small but vital role”
in international-trade litigation). However, the Byrd Amendment has created an interesting
opportunity for domestic producers to make such a claim. See id. at 551–52. Previous
equal-protection claims in trade law mostly stemmed from the tariff rates assigned to certain
products over others. See, e.g., Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (rejecting an equal-protection challenge to tariff rates for men’s gloves and finding a
lack of discriminatory intent). Another constitutional argument against the Byrd Amendment is
based on the First Amendment right to free speech, and asserts that the government practices
viewpoint discrimination by denying monetary benefits based solely on publicly expressed
opposition to a governmental investigation during the course of an AD/CVD proceeding. See
SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360 (rejecting SKF USA’s claim and upholding the Byrd Amendment as
constitutional under the First Amendment right to free speech).
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subsequent denial of certiorari appear to foreclose such claims by current and
future Byrd Amendment challengers.33
However, because SKF and the other major Byrd Amendment cases only
reviewed the law’s facial constitutionality,34 plaintiffs with strong factual cases
argue that the Byrd Amendment should be deemed unconstitutional as applied
to their individual circumstances.35 For example, United Synthetics, Inc., a
domestic producer of polyester staple fiber, did not exist at the time its
domestic industry filed a petition with the government, and thus had no
opportunity to show its support.36 Giorgio Foods, Inc., a domestic producer of
preserved mushrooms, took numerous actions to support its industry’s petition,
but did not produce a formal expression of support.37 These cases require
as-applied adjudication, which the Supreme Court increasingly prefers in
individual-rights litigation, rather than review based on facial validity.38
Furthermore, the Court has upheld as-applied challenges when a facial
challenge has failed.39
Given this recent activity in the courts, the constitutionality of the Byrd
Amendment must be reevaluated.40 This Note argues that SKF should not
foreclose the claims of other Byrd Amendment challengers; rather, the CIT and
the CAFC should newly review the constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment
33. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360; see also Supreme Court Declines to Review Ruling in Byrd
Amendment Case, supra note 31, at 10 (stating that SKF was the test case for the nearly fifty
similar Byrd Amendment cases).
34. See, e.g., SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1349–50; Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar Inc. v. United
States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1365 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008) (per curiam) (describing plaintiff
domestic producers’ claims as “facial constitutional challenges” to the Byrd Amendment).
35. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text; see also Shrimp Producers Raise
Constitutional Claims on Application of Byrd Law, INT’L TRADE DAILY, June 10, 2011 (noting
that plaintiffs in Tampa Bay Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL 934098, distinguished
their claims from SKF by “argu[ing] that its constitutional claims are ‘fundamentally different’
from those rejected in the SKF decision”).
36. Amended Complaint at 7, United Synthetics, Inc. v. United States, No. 08-00139 (Ct.
Int’l Trade Feb. 1, 2011).
37. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8–18.
38. See infra Part I.B.2.
39. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (noting that as-applied
challenges were “the proper means to consider exceptions,” even in situations when “facial
attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance”).
40. Though repealed, the Byrd Amendment remains relevant as indicated by
communications from Congress and other government representatives, emphasizing the law’s
international-trade implications and its impact on constitutional issues. See, e.g., Draft Senate
Letter on Byrd Amendment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 4, 2008, at 15 (asking Senate colleagues to
support the reinstatement of the Byrd Amendment); Highlights From Written Responses by USTR
Nominee Ron Kirk, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 13, 2009, at 7 (reporting that current U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk pledged to “formulate an administration position on reintroducing the
Byrd Amendment”); New Senate Finance Committee Features More Pro-Trade Dems, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Jan. 16, 2009, at 15 (commenting that two of the three pro-trade Democratic
members of the Senate Finance Committee voted for the Byrd Amendment).
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as applied to each plaintiff.41 Part I.A provides a general background on the
procedures for bringing an AD/CVD order, specifically focusing on the role of
the International Trade Commission (ITC) in making an injury determination.
This Part also analyzes the Byrd Amendment, and examines the support
requirement of the controversial affected-domestic-producer provision. Part
I.B reviews relevant Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection jurisprudence
and discusses the Supreme Court’s increasing preference for as-applied
constitutional challenges. Part II discusses SKF USA Inc. v. United States, in
which the CAFC ultimately upheld the Byrd Amendment as constitutional
under free-speech and equal-protection analyses. Part II also examines
differing court opinions regarding the Byrd Amendment’s constitutionality and
outlines the significant differences between the plaintiffs in SKF and other
Byrd Amendment challengers. Part III argues that, in light of recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence, SKF should not control other as-applied challenges to the
constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment. Part III further analyzes how
upcoming cases could serve as vehicles for sustaining a successful as-applied
equal-protection claim against the Byrd Amendment. Finally, Part IV
concludes and reiterates that courts should not be bound by previous rulings on
the Byrd Amendment’s facial validity, as determined in SKF because a court
that conducts an as-applied challenge must consider a plaintiff’s particular
situation, and therefore could find the Byrd Amendment to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
I. THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND ISSUES SURROUNDING ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Relevant Provisions of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Laws
Applicable to the Byrd Amendment42
1. General Purposes and Brief Overview of U.S. Antidumping and
Countervailing-Duty Laws
U.S. AD/CVD laws seek to “create a level playing field” for domestic
industries by combating the unfair trade practice known as dumping and
subsidization through the imposition of antidumping and countervailing
41. See infra Part III. Generally, constitutional challenges to laws occur through either
as-applied or facial challenges. Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges,
18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010). A facial constitutional challenge involves “a
head-on attack on the legislative judgment, an assertion that the challenged statute violates the
Constitution in all, or virtually all, of its applications.” United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154,
1171 (10th Cir. 2007). In contrast, an as-applied constitutional challenge “concedes that the
statute may be constitutional in many of its applications, but contends that it is not so under the
particular circumstances of the case.” Id.
42. This section seeks to provide only a basic introduction to the U.S. AD/CVD laws that
have implications for a Byrd Amendment analysis. For a more thorough discussion of trade law,
see CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES supra note 8, at 1.
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duties.43 Domestic law and international agreements regulate dumping and
subsidization;44 under U.S. law, a domestic industry affected by these practices
can initiate an AD/CVD investigation by filing a petition with Commerce and
the ITC.45 The petitioner—usually a U.S. domestic producer or group of
producers—must allege that its industry is being unduly harmed as a result of
dumping or subsidization.46
Dumping occurs when a foreign producer imports and sells its product on
the U.S. market for “less than fair value”: a lower price than what the product
would sell for in its domestic market.47 Under U.S. law, Commerce must
determine if there is a material difference between these two prices, known as
a “dumping margin.”48 If Commerce determines that a dumping margin exists,
and the ITC finds that there is a material injury (or threat thereof)49 to the
domestic industry as a result of this dumping margin, an antidumping duty will
be imposed on the merchandise.50 When issuing an antidumping order,
43. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 752 (discussing unfair trade regulations); see also 19
U.S.C. § 1671 (2006) (countervailing-duty laws); id. § 1673 (antidumping laws).
44. See CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES, supra note 8, at 3–5 (detailing how AD/CVD
investigations and remedial actions gain their statutory authority from the Tariff Act of 1930 as
amended, and are discussed in international agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and the North American Free Trade Agreement); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note
8, at 752–53.
45. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(1)–(2), 1673a(b)(1)–(2) (outlining the procedure for initiating
petitions and by filing with the administrative authority and the Commission, which are defined
by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1)–(2) as the Secretary of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission respectively). Alternatively, if Commerce believes that dumping or subsidization is
occurring, it may bring an investigation of its own volition. Id. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a)(1).
46. Id. § 1677(9)(C)–(G) (defining an “interested party” for purposes of filing an AD/CVD
petition).
47. See id. § 1677(34) (“The terms ‘dumped’ and ‘dumping’ refer to the sale or likely sale
of goods at less than fair value.”). Determining whether a product is sold at less than fair value
begins by calculating the price of the good in the foreign producer’s home market—the “normal
value”—and comparing that to the price the foreign producer sells the good for in the U.S.
market—the “export price.” Id. §§ 1677a(a), 1677b(a). If the actual figures are unavailable
(because, for instance, the good may not be sold in the foreign producer’s home market, or the
good may be sold in the United States through an affiliate), then a constructed normal value and
export price will be used. Id. §§ 1677a(b), 1677b(a)(4). Additionally, a complex system of
adjustments must be made to each figure to account for any differences in how the two products
are produced and sold. Id. § 1677a(c)-(d), 1677b(a)(6)-(8); see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8,
at 770.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (explaining that Commerce determines if foreign merchandise “is
being, or likely to be, sold in the United States for less than its fair value”); id. § 1677(35)(A)
(defining “dumping margin” as “the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export
price”).
49. Id. § 1677(7)(A) (defining “material injury” as “harm which is not inconsequential,
immaterial, or unimportant”).
50. Id. § 1673. Throughout the investigative process, Commerce and the ITC must adhere
to strict deadlines when making their respective determinations. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note
8, at 764–65 (providing an overview of the differing timetables for completing an AD/CVD
investigation).
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Commerce instructs CBP to collect duties on the incoming goods it determines
to be injurious.51
Countervailing-duty laws, on the other hand, are aimed at combating certain
subsidies52 that foreign governments provide to their domestic producers that
export products into the U.S. market.53 By accepting a subsidy, the foreign
producer can sell its product at a lower price on the U.S. market, thereby
distorting fair competition.54 Under U.S. law, certain subsidies are considered
countervailable and subject to duties that attempt to neutralize their negative
effect on the market.55 Similar to an antidumping investigation, Commerce
must determine that subsidization is occurring in the subject industry,56 and the
ITC must also determine that the subsidization has caused a material injury or
threat of material injury to the U.S. domestic industry.57 If both of these
conditions are met, then Commerce will issue a countervailing-duty order
instructing CBP to collect duties on the import in question.58
The AD/CVD order instructs CBP to collect duties on the product when it
enters the United States in an amount sufficient to counteract the level of
dumping or subsidization.59 These initial duties are estimates; final duty
assessments are completed a few years after the initial collection.60 Final duty
assessments are further prolonged if the AD/CVD order becomes the subject of

51. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e.
52. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 848 (explaining the difference between
“‘legitimate government’ activities” and “trade-distorting subsidies”). These trade-distorting
subsidies are divided into domestic subsidies and export subsidies. Id. A “domestic subsidy is
granted to an industry on all of its production of a product, regardless of whether that product[] is
exported.” Id. By contrast, “an export subsidy . . . is paid to an industry only on products that are
exported.” Id. at 849. Under U.S. law, certain domestic and export subsidies are considered
“countervailable subsidies,” and are thus subject to duties. Id. at 848–49.
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
54. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 849 (noting that both domestic and export subsidies
“can distort resource allocation by inducing production and exportation that is otherwise
uneconomic”).
55. Id. at 848–49.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
57. Id.; see CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES supra note 8, at 4–5 (explaining that unless the
subsidy has been addressed by a trade agreement, any threat of material injury is sufficient).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e.
59. Id. (“[Commerce] shall publish a countervailing duty order which—(1) directs customs
officers to assess a countervailing duty equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy
determined or estimated to exist . . . .”); id. § 1673e(a)(1) (“[Commerce] shall publish an
antidumping duty order which—(1) directs customs officers to assess an antidumping duty equal
to the amount by which the normal value of the merchandise exceeds the export price . . . .”).
60. See CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES, supra note 8, at 10–11 (providing an overview of
different reviews of an order that may prolong final duty assessment); GAO REPORT, supra note
4, at 25 (describing the process of liquidation, which is a term used to describe the making of a
final duty assessment).
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litigation.61 As a result, an estimated $1 billion in Byrd Amendment funds
awaits distribution.62
2. Defining the Scope of the Industry Affected: A Closer Look at the ITC’s
Role in an AD/CVD Investigation
As noted above, the ITC must “define the scope of the industry that is
affected by competition from imported goods and . . . determine whether the
industry has suffered or been threatened with material injury as a result of
dumped or subsidized imports.”63 As part of this determination, the ITC relies
on AD/CVD petitions and questionnaires sent to potentially affected members
of the domestic industry asking if they support, oppose, or take no position on
the petition.64 These surveys are taken throughout the course of an AD/CVD
investigation and do not always reach every member of an industry.65 The ITC
may also rely on letters of support from domestic producers that did not
receive a questionnaire, but that desire to take a position on the matter
formally.66
Ideally, every member of a domestic industry would have an opportunity to
express their support for the petition; however, this is not always the case and
is not necessarily relevant when the determination is not intended to discern
whether each domestic producer was injured by the dumping or
subsidization.67 Rather, the ITC seeks a representative portion of petition
supporters to determine whether sufficient data exist for an investigation to
proceed.68 Determining the scope of the affected industry also helps determine

61. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
62. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
63. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)
(describing the role of the ITC in a countervailing-duty investigation); § 1673(2) (describing the
role of the ITC in an antidumping investigation).
64. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12; see also 19 C.F.R. § 207.8 (2011) (describing
ITC regulations on the issuance of questionnaires in connection with an ongoing AD/CVD
investigation). A domestic producer often has several reasons why it may choose either to oppose
or to take no position on an AD/CVD petition. See CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra
note 2, at 20–21 (highlighting that, among other issues, producers may question the effectiveness
of AD/CVD orders and find supporting petitions to be too costly, or not in the best interest of
their businesses).
65. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12.
66. Id. at 12 (noting that producers may indicate support via a letter); see also 19 C.F.R.
§ 207.26 (describing permissible brief, voluntary statements submitted by nonparties in an
ongoing AD/CVD investigation).
67. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12 (finding that the ITC “generally strive[s] to
cover 100 percent of [an] industry” but occasionally “surveys a sample of U.S. producers instead
of the entire industry . . . account[ing] for 10 percent or less of production” (internal footnote
omitted)).
68. Id. (“[T]he ITC’s investigative process does not result in collecting information from all
industry participants, because it is intended for purposes other than CDSOA.”).
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whether an individual producer qualifies as an “affected domestic producer”
for purposes of the Byrd Amendment payouts.69
3. The Byrd Amendment: Providing Relief to a Continuously Injured
Domestic Industry
Although Congress had established trade laws years before, these measures
were not having the expected curative effect on unfair foreign trading
practices.70 The Byrd Amendment was enacted (1) to strengthen the remedial
nature of previous AD/CVD laws, (2) bring about fair trade conditions, and (3)
help domestic producers combat unfair foreign trade practices.71 To
accomplish these ends, Congress intended Byrd Amendment payouts to
compensate producers for losses due to dumping and subsidization that
occurred before and after the enactment of an AD/CVD order. 72
Following the Byrd Amendment’s contentious enactment,73 critics from
several policy areas called for a repeal, arguing that the provision was
unnecessary, costly, and unfairly benefited only those producers that fit the
narrow requirement of the “affected domestic producer” at the expense of their
competitors, both foreign and domestic.74 These select few producers would
69. See id. (explaining that CDSOA eligibility is linked to the ITC’s process of determining
domestic-industry harm during AD/CVD investigations).
70. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 784. There are several reasons why these
measures were ineffective. Foreign producers discovered ways to get around AD/CVD orders as
they were levied by either failing to pay duties or making slight adjustments to their importing
routines. Id. Some foreign producers also found paying AD/CVD duties more cost effective than
changing their business practices. 144 CONG. REC. 14,962 (1998) (statement of Sen. Michael
DeWine). Furthermore, foreign countries accused of subsidizing would create new ways to
maintain benefits for their producers. Id. Combined, these maneuvers continued to harm the U.S.
domestic industries that had successfully lobbied for AD/CVD orders against their foreign
competition. Id.
71. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (summarizing these three specific purposes); see
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X § 1002(3) 114 Stat.
1549, 1549A-72 (2000).
72. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, § 1002(3) (discussing the harmful effects
of dumping and subsidization before and after AD/CVD orders). In support of his Amendment,
Senator Byrd argued that although domestic producers had “legal remedies to challenge foreign
actions . . . [they did not have] adequate means to recover from the losses resulting from those
actions.” 146 CONG. REC. 23,117 (2000) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd). Senator Michael
DeWine, the original sponsor of CDSOA, argued that this new measure would “compensate for
damages” and effectively “discourage foreign companies from dumping and subsidization, since
it would actually assist U.S. competitors at their expense.” 144 CONG. REC. 14,962 (statement of
Sen. Michael DeWine).
73. CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that it was enacted
“without committee or floor amendment in either House”); see also supra note 2 (providing
background on the Byrd Amendment’s troubled history).
74. See 146 CONG. REC. 23,092 (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (voicing concern
with the government’s spending on the Byrd Amendment during a floor debate); GAO REPORT,
supra note 4, at 44–45 (explaining how the Byrd Amendment works only to benefit a limited
number of domestic producers while harming other domestic producers); Presidential Statement,
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essentially receive a double benefit—the additional Byrd money and an
advantage over their competition.75
a. The Byrd Amendment’s Affected-Domestic-Producer Provision
The Byrd Amendment requires the ITC to compose an annual list of affected
domestic producers for existing AD/CVD orders to send to CBP for Byrd
distribution issuance.76 The Byrd Amendment defines “affected domestic
producer” as any producer that “was a petitioner or interested party in support
of the petition with respect to which an antidumping duty order . . . or a
countervailing duty order has been entered and . . . remains in operation.”77
This support can be demonstrated “by letter or through questionnaire response”
to the ITC during the original investigation.78 Thus, the only domestic
producers considered affected domestic producers eligible for Byrd
Amendment distribution are those that filed the petition and have demonstrated
their support for the petition during the original investigation.79
Conversely, the producers that checked “no position” or “oppose” on the
original petition questionnaires are ineligible for Byrd Amendment payouts.80
The exclusion also applies to companies that did not send petition-support
letters, and those that would have supported the petition but did not have
knowledge of the pending investigation.81 This provision similarly excludes
supra note 2, at 2670 (expressing opposition to the Byrd Amendment’s selective and excessive
subsidies).
75. 114 CONG. REC. 14,962 (statement of Sen. Michael DeWine) (noting that CDSOA
payouts gave producers a “double-hit” over foreign producers by subsidizing domestic products
and discouraging foreign dumping); see also CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at
2 (“[M]any . . . believe that it adds a level of ‘protection’ on subject U.S. products in addition to
the ameliorative action afforded by [prior] trade remedies.”).
76. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675c(d)(1), (3) (2000), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171,
§ 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154–55.
77. Id. § 1675c(b)(1).
78. Id. § 1675c(d)(1); see also supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (providing the
ITC’s procedures for questionnaires and letters of support during the original investigation). In
some instances, those producers that supported an active AD/CVD order by making appearances
at sunset reviews may also be eligible. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1); see also supra note 17 (providing
a short description of sunset reviews).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1).
80. See, e.g., SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337,
1343, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (determining that SKF USA, a domestic producer who checked the
“no support” box on the original petition, was correctly denied Byrd Amendment funds); PS Chez
Sidney, L.L.C v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331, 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2006) (declaring the Byrd Amendment as applied to PS Chez Sidney, a domestic producer who
checked the “take no position” box on the original petition, unconstitutional under the First
Amendment’s right to free speech), rev’d, 409 Fed. App’x 327, 329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (overturning
the CIT and upholding the Byrd Amendment as constitutional under the First Amendment).
81. Frequently Asked Questions: Byrd Amendment/CDSOA, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N
(Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/byrd_amendment.htm.
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domestic companies that began production after the initial investigation, and
did not have an opportunity to show support for the petition.82
b. Procedures for Obtaining a Byrd Amendment Payout
Under the Byrd Amendment, the Commissioner of CBP is responsible for
providing annual fund distributions received under AD/CVD orders to affected
domestic producers.83 Before making distributions, CBP is required to deposit
all collected AD/CVD duties into special accounts.84 Upon receipt of the
ITC’s yearly list of affected domestic producers, CBP publishes in the Federal
Register the list of affected domestic producers eligible to receive payouts.85
Once this list is published, eligible parties must certify the following: their
want of distributions; their eligibility as an affected domestic producer; and
their qualifying expenditures.86 Distributions under the Byrd Amendment are
made to qualifying producers “on a pro rata basis,” meaning the more a
producer claims under qualifying expenditures, the more they are eligible to
receive.87 CBP then distributes the funds from the special accounts to affected
domestic producers for their claimed qualifying expenditures.88 Because of the
Byrd Amendment’s 2006 repeal, only those claims made between 2001 and
2007 are eligible for Byrd distributions.89
B. Relevant Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Equal Protection, Rational-Basis
Review, and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges
1. Overview of Equal-Protection Challenges Under Rational-Basis Review
One of the myriad of challenges to the Byrd Amendment asserts that the
Amendment violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by
awarding payouts to select domestic producers, while denying compensation to
82. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (“[A]s a result [of the affected domestic producer
provision], a number of U.S. companies, such as those that began production after orders
covering their products came into effect, are ineligible.”); see also, Amended Complaint, supra
note 36, at 7.
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(3); see also CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT supra note 2, at
3–4 (explaining the CDSOA fund distribution process).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(e).
85. Id. § 1675c(c)–(d)(3).
86. Id. § 1675c(d)(2); see id. § 1675c(b)(4) (defining “qualifying expenditure” as any
“expenditure incurred after the issuance of the antidumping duty finding or order or
countervailing duty order . . . .”).
87. Id. § 1675c(d)(3); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 16 (“CDSOA uses a pro rata
formula to allocate disbursements under a given order among the eligible companies filing
claims, with percentages determined according to the claims of qualifying expenditures
submitted. . . . This pro rata formula creates an incentive for producers to claim as many
expenses as possible relative to other producers so that their share of the funds available under an
order is as large as possible.”).
88. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(3), (e)(1).
89. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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other similarly situated domestic producers.90 The Fourteenth Amendment
declares that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”91 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to mean that the
law should treat all similarly situated persons alike.92 Depending on what is at
issue, equal-protection claims are subject to either a strict form of scrutiny, an
intermediate form of scrutiny, or a rational-basis form of scrutiny.93 Generally,
the inquiry is the same for all three standards: is the law’s classification or
discrimination justified by some sufficient government purpose?94
a. Equal-Protection Cases Requiring a Heightened Standard of Scrutiny:
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications
The Supreme Court has identified two types of cases in which a law violates
the Equal Protection Clause under a heightened standard of review: when it
threatens (1) the protection of fundamental rights,95 and (2) the protection of
the rights of those who fall within suspect classifications.96 Under strict
90. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1363 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500
(1954) (holding that the federal government is also subject to equal-protection requirements under
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
92. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
93. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671–72
(3d ed. 2006) (briefly describing strict, intermediate, and rational-basis review).
94. Id. at 673.
95. Fundamental rights include any enumerated right expressly guaranteed within the text of
the Constitution—including freedom of speech—and certain unenumerated rights, such as the
right to privacy in family planning. See CHEMERINSKY supra note 93, at 675–76, 792 (discussing
“liberties . . . so important that they are deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’”); see also United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (outlining an elevated level of review
that courts can apply to laws that infringe on constitutional rights).
96. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding racially based
school segregation unconstitutional under the auspices of equal protection); see also Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (using a strict-scrutiny analysis to hold a state law that
denied welfare benefits on the basis of national origin unconstitutional under equal-protection
jurisprudence). Courts analyze gender classifications under an intermediate standard of scrutiny.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that the Virginia Military
Institute failed to demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its male-only
admissions policy). Beyond these few suspect classes, the Supreme Court has refused to extend a
heightened standard of scrutiny to other classifications. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
635 (1996) (declaring that a Colorado constitutional amendment violated the equal protection
guarantee by excluding homosexuals from protection, but refusing to declare homosexuals a
suspect class); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 450 (1985) (refusing to find
the mentally handicapped a suspect class, but nevertheless invalidating a law that precluded
establishment of a group home for the mentally handicapped); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (ruling that age discrimination was not a violation of the Equal Protection
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scrutiny—the most rigorous standard—laws must be narrowly tailored to fulfill
a compelling government interest, and use the least restrictive means to
accomplish that end.97 Under the less stringent intermediate-scrutiny standard,
there must be a substantial relation between the law and an important
government interest.98 Under both of these standards, the government bears
the burden of proof.99
b. Rational-Basis Standard Under the Equal-Protection Clause:
Presumption of Constitutionality
If a statute accused of violating the Equal Protection Clause does not
infringe on a fundamental right, or discriminate against a member of a suspect
class, then a court will employ a rational-basis standard of scrutiny.100 Under
this standard, courts must determine whether the alleged discriminatory effect
of the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.101 Courts
may accept any conceivable purpose for the law, which does not confine the
inquiry solely to legislative text, history, or intent.102 The challenger of the
law, not the government, bears the burden of proof.103
The Supreme Court has also implicitly conducted rational-basis review for
legislation specifically involving social or economic issues.104 Furthermore,
the Court has construed a constitutional presumption that, “absent some reason
to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process” under a rational-basis review.105 With such a low
standard for the government to meet, the Supreme Court will generally uphold
a statute as not violating equal protection under rational-basis review.106

Clause under a rational-basis review); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–33
(1973) (ruling that discrimination based on financial status was a violation of equal protection
under rational-basis review).
97. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying the strict-scrutiny standard to
racially based discrimination); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 541.
98. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying the intermediate-scrutiny standard
to gender-based discrimination).
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 541–42.
100. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class . . . [it will be upheld] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.”).
101. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (using rational-basis review).
102. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (“[A] statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
103. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“The burden is on the one attacking
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” (footnote
omitted)).
104. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
105. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted).
106. See FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (describing rational basis
as “a paradigm of judicial restraint”).
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However, a presumption favoring constitutionality does not render a
rational-basis inquiry completely moot. On numerous occasions the Supreme
Court has found it appropriate to strike down a law using this standard.107 In
these circumstances, the Court found either a lack of legitimate government
purpose behind the legislation, or determined that the classification made was
not “reasonable in light of its purpose.”108 Stated another way, a court can
strike down a law under rational-basis review if the law is “clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, [or] not an exercise of judgment.”109
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court determined
that no legitimate government interest was served by enacting legislation that
In so doing, the Court held
promoted wealth discrimination.110
unconstitutional a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which
denied households that included unrelated individuals eligibility to the
assistance program.111 The Court found that this particular amended statutory
classification was “clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act.”112 The
Court searched for any other purported government interest that could justify
the discriminatory classification, but found none; therefore, the Court held the
amended provision unconstitutional under rational-basis review.113
2. Judicial Preference for As-Applied Constitutional Challenges in
Individual-Rights Litigation
a. Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges
Generally, plaintiffs may challenge a law’s constitutionality in two distinct
ways: by challenging the validity of the law on its face, or by challenging the
validity of the law as applied to that plaintiff’s individual circumstance.114 The

107. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 635 (1996) (finding that an amendment to
the Colorado constitution prohibiting specialized state protection for homosexuals was
unconstitutional under rational-basis scrutiny because it was “[a] law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government”); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 450 (holding that a city zoning ordinance requiring a
special-use permit to establish a group home for the mentally challenged was unconstitutional
under rational-basis scrutiny, and explaining that “[t]he State may not rely on a classification
whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
108. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
109. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 640 (1937)).
110. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
111. Id. at 529, 538.
112. Id. at 534.
113. Id. at 534–35.
114. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 236 (1994) (providing a conventional summary of as-applied versus facial constitutional
challenges); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
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classic formulation of a facial challenge appears in United States v. Salerno, in
which then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated “[a] facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.”115 An as-applied challenge, on the other hand,
“concedes that the statute may be constitutional in many of its applications, but
contends that it is not so under the particular circumstances of the case.”116
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its preference for as-applied
challenges, which it calls “the basic building block[] of constitutional
adjudication.”117 This preference flows from the constitutional requirement
that courts only adjudicate those cases and controversies as they are properly
presented to the court, and that courts do not unnecessarily invalidate
legislation that has not been sufficiently challenged.118
b. The Roberts Supreme Court’s Trend Toward As-Applied Constitutional
Challenges in Individual-Rights Litigation
One of the hallmarks of Supreme Court jurisprudence under Chief Justice
John Roberts’ Court is an increasing preference for as-applied over facial
constitutional challenges, especially in the context of individual-rights
litigation.119 The Roberts Court has exercised this trend in the context of
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (providing a seminal account of facial and as-applied
challenges); Kreit, supra note 41, at 657.
115. 481 U.S. 739, 745, 751 (1987) (holding that the challenged portion of the Bail Reform
Act survived a facial constitutional attack), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); see also
United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)
(defining a facial challenge as “a head-on attack on the legislative judgment, an assertion that the
challenged statute violates the Constitution in all, or virtually all, of its applications”), vacated,
552 U.S. 1306 (2008).
116. Pruitt, 502 F.3d at 1171 (McConnell, J., concurring).
117. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (quoting Fallon, supra note 114, at
1328); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006)
(“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the
solution to the problem. We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications
of a statute while leaving other applications in force . . . .”).
118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960) (“The very
foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in
the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and controversies properly before them.”);
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)
(holding courts must “adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies”).
119. Kreit, supra note 41, at 660 (noting the Court’s shift in favor of as-applied challenges in
abortion cases); Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557,
1557–58 (2010) (“[T]he cases cited as evidence for the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied
challenges all involve constitutional challenges which concede the legislative power to enact the
provision but nevertheless argue for unconstitutionality because the statute intrudes upon rights or
liberties protected by the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and
As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 784 (2009) (“This
overview of the Roberts Court’s recent jurisprudence establishes both the frequency with which
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abortion rights and First Amendment rights.120 In Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party, the Court considered a facial challenge to
a Washington state law that argued that the law violated associational rights
protected by the First Amendment.121 Finding that the law “does not on its
face severely burden respondents’ associational rights,” the Court rejected the
facial constitutional challenge.122 Similarly, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court
found that a facial challenge to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 “should not have been entertained in the first instance.”123 Rather, the
Court held that “the proper means to consider exceptions [to the law] is by [an]
as-applied challenge,” which the Court defined as a “discrete and well-defined
instance[] [that] has or is likely to occur.”124 Lower courts seemingly have
taken notice of this trend, and appellate court decisions have increasingly
distinguished between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges while
noting a preference for the latter.125
II. SKF AND OTHER BYRD AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
A. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection: The Federal Circuit
Holds the Byrd Amendment Constitutional Under Free-Speech and EqualProtection Rubrics
SKF USA is a domestic producer of antifriction steel bearings that opposed
a 1988 dumping petition via a questionnaire.126 As a result, when SKF USA
requested affected-domestic-producer status in 2005, it was denied.127 SKF
USA subsequently challenged the Byrd Amendment in the CIT, alleging that
that Court has emphasized the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges and its
preference for the latter as a mode for constitutional rights litigation.”).
120. Metzger, supra note 119, at 774 n.2 (“[T]he Roberts Court has rejected facial challenges
asserting violations of abortion and First Amendment rights, two contexts in which facial
challenges were previously often accepted.”); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444 (2008) (First Amendment rights); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (abortion rights).
121. 552 U.S. at 444.
122. Id. at 458–59.
123. 550 U.S. at 167.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“A facial challenge to a statute or regulation is independent of the individual bringing the
complaint and the circumstances surrounding his or her challenge. . . . In contrast, an as-applied
challenge is specific to the facts of the particular individual involved in the suit.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 529–30
(6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s preference for as-applied challenges in the
context of a Fourth Amendment claim).
126. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
127. Id. at 1358.
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the Byrd Amendment was facially unconstitutional because it “discriminat[ed]
between similarly situated domestic producers” in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.128 Faced with an equal-protection challenge subject to
rational-basis scrutiny,129 the CIT first came to the determination that the Byrd
Amendment discriminated between similarly situated domestic producers
based on whether they supported the original AD/CVD petition.130 Then, the
court turned to whether there was any legitimate government purpose to
support the discrimination.131 Viewing the Byrd Amendment in light of its
legislative history and intent,132 the court concluded that the Byrd
Amendment’s purpose was to help domestic industries as a whole, and not
each domestic producer as an individual entity.133 Therefore, the court found
the Byrd Amendment’s distinction between individual producers
“incongruous” with this purpose, and ultimately sustained SKF USA’s facial
equal-protection challenge.134
A divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed on appeal,
and found the Byrd Amendment constitutional based on the First Amendment
right to free speech.135 In conducting the free-speech analysis, the court
likened the Byrd Amendment’s support provision to cases that involved
commercial speech and necessitated an intermediate form of scrutiny requiring
a “substantial government interest.”136 The court found that the government
had a substantial interest in rewarding parties who promoted the government’s
policy of preventing dumping and subsidization.137 Because the Byrd
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1360. The court noted that because the Byrd Amendment falls under “areas of
social and economic policy” it is subject to this lower standard of scrutiny. Id.
130. Id. (“As the CDSOA is applied here, similarly situated entities, i.e. SKF and Timken,
are treated differently and thus, do not stand equal before the law.”).
131. Id. at 1361.
132. Id. The court also focused on the Byrd Amendment’s congruence with previous trade
laws. Id. at 1362 (noting that the Byrd Amendment altered previous trade laws and “should be
read in congruity with the other provisions therein”).
133. Id. at 1361–62 (“[CDSOA is] designed to ensure that domestic industries, not any
individual company [can] compete in the marketplace.”).
134. Id. at 1361, 1363.
135. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). On appeal, SKF USA advanced a First Amendment free speech theory, rather than
equal protection, as its primary argument. Id. at 1349. Under this theory, for the law to be upheld
under free-speech doctrines, the court would have to find that it was narrowly tailored to a
substantial-government interest. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 792.
136. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1354–55 (noting that the Supreme Court’s commercial-speech
jurisprudence calls for an intermediate form of scrutiny, as opposed to strict scrutiny applied
under a traditional free-speech analysis).
137. Id. at 1352. The CAFC’s purpose determination is a substantial deviation from the
CIT’s earlier findings. Compare id. (finding that the purpose of the Byrd Amendment was to
reward parties who reported unfair foreign-trade practices), with SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1362
(finding that the purpose of the Byrd Amendment was to help domestic industries as a
whole— not any individual producer—recover from unfair foreign-trade practices).
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Amendment survived a facial First Amendment challenge, the court concluded
that it easily survived a less rigorous rational-basis scrutiny under
equal-protection analysis.138 The Supreme Court denied certiorari; thus, the
Federal Circuit’s holding in SKF currently controls similar pending and future
Byrd Amendment cases.139
However, the Federal Circuit has signaled its willingness to reconsider a
constitutional challenge to the Byrd Amendment. For example, Judge Richard
Linn’s SKF II dissent strongly contested the majority’s holding and explained
that “[t]he majority errs by . . . graft[ing] its ‘reward’ purpose onto the statute,
when that purpose is not apparent in the statutory text or legislative history and
has been expressly disclaimed by the government in this case.”140 Even the
SKF II majority left open the possibility that a future plaintiff that had shown
support, but failed to make a formal expression, could be eligible for Byrd
money under the court’s construction of the affected-domestic-producer
provision.141 The court also indicated in PS Chez Sidney that SKF would
control for the constitutional issues presented in that particular case, but that its
opinion could not to be used as a precedential holding in future cases.142 These
factors suggest that the Federal Circuit may be willing to reconsider a future
constitutional challenge to the Byrd Amendment.143
B. Survey of Other Byrd Amendment Challengers: Factually Distinguishable
from SKF Plaintiffs
In the wake of SKF, remaining Byrd Amendment challengers whose cases
were stayed pending the outcome of SKF and other test cases will now have an
opportunity to be heard.144 Challengers will undoubtedly focus on the strength
of their factual case and attempt to distinguish themselves from the plaintiffs in

138. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360.
139. SKF USA, Inc. v. Customs & Border Prot., 130 S. Ct. 3273, 3273 (2010); PS Chez
Sidney, L.L.C. v. United States, No. 2008-1526, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22584, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 28, 2010) (“SKF is controlling with regard to all constitutional issues presented in this
appeal.”); see also Supreme Court Declines to Review Ruling in Byrd Amendment Case, supra
note 31, at 10 (stating that SKF was the test case for nearly fifty similar Byrd Amendment cases).
140. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1361 (Linn, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1353 (“The language of the Byrd Amendment is easily susceptible to a
construction that rewards actions (litigation support) rather than the expression of particular
views.”); see also infra note 159 and accompanying text (advancing the argument of Giorgio
Foods that this particular language supports their position).
142. PS Chez Sidney, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22584, at *3. But see id. at *1 (noting that the
decision “MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT”).
143. On rehearing en banc, a divided court again denied SKF USA’s appeal; however, four
members of the court, including now-Chief Judge Randall Rader and Judge Richard Linn,
strongly dissented. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF III), 583 F.3d 1340,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
144. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining that many cases were stayed
pending the outcomes of SKF and other Byrd test cases that have since been resolved).
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SKF, who actively opposed the underlying antidumping petition.145 United
Synthetics, Inc. v. United States, involving a domestic producer of polyester
staple fiber suing to get its share of collected duties under the Byrd
Amendment,146 is one example of the many cases in which a stay was recently
lifted.147 In 2000, Commerce issued an antidumping-duty order on polyester
staple fiber from Korea and Taiwan after receiving a petition from certain
domestic producers claiming injury.148 Five days after Commerce issued the
antidumping order, United Synthetics, Inc. (USI) began operating as a U.S.
manufacturer of polyester staple fiber.149 The Byrd Amendment came into
effect months later.150 In 2007, USI requested to be added to the list of
affected domestic producers, but was subsequently denied “because it did not
support the original petitions.”151 Unlike the plaintiffs in SKF, USI did not
exist at the time that Commerce issued the original antidumping order;
therefore, USI lacked the opportunity to show the requisite support for the
petition.152
Another plaintiff, Giorgio Foods, Inc., is a domestic producer of preserved
mushrooms that “took no position with respect to the petition,” on the ITC’s
questionnaire, but did take “numerous actions to support the petition and its
filing.”153 In the aftermath of SKF, Giorgio’s arguments have relied on dicta in
the Federal Circuit’s decision, which indicate that a producer who showed
support outside of a support letter or questionnaire could be eligible for Byrd
money.154 In comparison, SKF USA and similar Byrd Amendment challengers
were mostly producers that demonstrated actual opposition to AD/CVD
petitions by checking the “no support” or “take no position” boxes on ITC

145. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rossella Brevetti, Shrimp Producers Raise Constitutional Claims on
Application of Byrd Law, INT’L TRADE DAILY, June 10, 2011 (discussing a post-SKF claim in
which the plaintiffs argued “that its constitutional claims [were] ‘fundamentally different’ from
those rejected in the SKF decision”).
146. Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 1–4.
147. See Letter from Gregory W. Carman, supra note 31 (“[T]he Court will entertain
questions pertaining to scheduling resulting from the lifting of the stays in these cases.”).
148. Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 7–8.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 8.
151. Id. at 9–10.
152. Id. at 4, 7–8.
153. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8, 13.
154. Id. at 4 (“Under SKF, to avoid First Amendment free speech problems that otherwise
would exist, the petition support requirement must be construed such that eligibility for
distributions is based on ‘actions (litigation support) rather than the expression of particular
views.’” (citations omitted)).
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questionnaires.155 Therefore, plaintiffs who have a more favorable factual
situation argue that their claim should not be foreclosed by the outcome in
SKF.
III. SKF SHOULD NOT FORECLOSE FUTURE AS-APPLIED EQUAL-PROTECTION
CHALLENGES TO THE BYRD AMENDMENT
A. SKF Bars Only Facial Challenges to the Byrd Amendment
SKF appears to foreclose any facial constitutional challenge to the Byrd
Amendment both with regard to equal protection and free speech, which
requires pending challengers to rely on as-applied arguments to procure
possible distributions.156 The Byrd Amendment’s affected-domestic-producer
provision requires that a domestic producer show support for the underlying
AD/CVD petition in order to receive payouts from the duties imposed.157
When analyzing SKF USA’s challenge, the Federal Circuit considered whether
the Byrd Amendment’s discrimination against a producer who actively
opposed the petition was related to a substantial government interest.158
Despite its holding that the Byrd Amendment survived a facial constitutional
challenge, both under free-speech and equal-protection doctrines, the Federal
Circuit has signaled that it may reconsider a constitutional challenge to the
Byrd Amendment.159 In considering an as-applied analysis, the Federal Circuit
must take note of the Supreme Court’s increasing preference for as-applied
challenges in individual-rights litigation.160 Specifically, the Supreme Court
has held that an as-applied challenge may be sustained where a facial challenge
has failed.161 With this guidance, the Federal Circuit should reconsider a
future Byrd Amendment challenger’s equal-protection claim as applied to that
individual producer.162 These challengers, whose factual situations differ

155. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357–58, 1363 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006) (describing SKF USA as a domestic producer that opposed the original petition, and
was therefore denied Byrd Amendment funds), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs &
Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. U.S.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331, 1333–34 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (describing PS
Chez Sidney as a domestic producer that checked the “[t]ake no position” box on the final
petition, and was therefore denied Byrd money), rev’d, No. 2008-1526, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
22584 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2010).
156. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (finding that an as-applied
constitutional challenge may be upheld where a previous facial challenge has failed); supra Part
I.B.2.b (describing the increasing preference of the Roberts Court for as-applied challenges in
individual-rights litigation).
157. See supra Part I.A.3.a.
158. See SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1355.
159. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part I.B.2.
161. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
162. See supra Part II.B.
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significantly from SKF USA’s, have a stronger claim that could survive
rational-basis scrutiny.163
As a test case, SKF USA’s claim was arguably easy to defeat; the plaintiffs
did not support the underlying petition, rather, they clearly opposed the petition
by checking the “no support” box on the ITC’s questionnaire. 164 Plaintiffs that
have supported the petition by other means, but failed to express outright
support—such as Giorgio Foods—have a stronger claim than SKF USA.165
Similarly, plaintiffs that were denied an opportunity to show support because
they were not in existence at the filing of the original petition—such as
USI—have a stronger claim than SKF USA.166 As these differences are
extremely significant, future Byrd Amendment challengers should not be
bound by the CAFC’s SKF holding.167
B. Equal-Protection Challenges Should Be Reconsidered
Many previously stayed Byrd Amendment cases are currently pending
before the CIT.168 In light of the Supreme Court jurisprudence noted above,
these cases should not be controlled by SKF, and instead could be vehicles for
sustaining successful as-applied equal-protection claims against the Byrd
Amendment. In analyzing an as-applied equal-protection challenge to the
Byrd Amendment, the court must undertake several steps to determine: (1) the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply—strict, intermediate, or rational basis, 2)
the purpose of the Byrd Amendment and its effect on a particular producer,
and 3) whether the appropriate level of scrutiny is met.169
The CIT will likely find that an as-applied equal-protection claim is
reviewable under a rational-basis standard because there is no violation of a
fundamental right or discrimination of some suspect class; this would trigger a
heightened form of scrutiny.170 In addition, because the Byrd Amendment falls
under the scope of economic policy—albeit international—it is subject to a
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
165. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8, 13.
166. See Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7.
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 674 (outlining steps taken by a court in an equal
protection analysis); supra Part I.B.1.b.
170. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that a statute
that burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class requires some heightened form of
scrutiny); SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006) (reviewing SKF USA’s equal-protection claim under rational-basis scrutiny), rev’d
sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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lower standard of scrutiny.171 Under rational-basis review, the court must
determine whether the alleged discrimination caused by the Byrd Amendment
is rationally related to the purpose of the law.172 In discerning a purpose, the
court may accept any conceivable justification for the law, and therefore does
not confine the inquiry to the Byrd Amendment’s text, legislative history, or
intent alone.173
With such a low standard of review, the court must acknowledge the
tremendous burden any plaintiff must overcome to prove the Byrd Amendment
unconstitutional on equal-protection grounds.174 As noted previously, there is
a constitutional presumption that even the most “improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process.”175 Arguably, in this
instance, the democratic process played its intended role as the legislation was
However, this presumption does not render a
repealed in 2006.176
rational-basis review completely moot; numerous courts have found laws
unconstitutional under equal protection using this standard.177
As in SKF, there is no question before the court that the Byrd Amendment’s
affected-domestic-producer provision as applied to certain plaintiffs
discriminates between similarly situated domestic producers.178 For example,
USI is a domestic producer in an industry that is currently experiencing
negative effects from continued dumping, despite a long-standing antidumping
171. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“When social or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the [government] wide latitude.” (citations omitted)); SKF I, 451
F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (noting that the Byrd Amendment falls under the scope of social and
economic policy and should be reviewed under a lower, rational-basis standard).
172. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citing that under a rational-basis review,
the alleged discrimination must be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose).
173. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (“A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
174. See, e.g., SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (acknowledging the burden in establishing that
the Byrd Amendment unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection Clause under rational-basis
scrutiny).
175. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted); see also supra Part
I.B.1.b. (outlining this presumption toward constitutionality under a rational-basis review).
176. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 (2005)
(repealing Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, § 1675c).
177. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (finding that a state constitutional amendment denying
homosexuals protection violated equal-protection principles under rational-basis scrutiny);
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that a law denying
permission for the establishment of a group home for the mentally handicapped violated
equal-protection doctrines under rational-basis scrutiny).
178. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c, repealed
by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 154–55 (2005) (explaining
that only domestic producers that affirmatively demonstrated specific support for a petition are
considered affected domestic producers eligible for Byrd Amendment distributions); SKF I, 451
F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (noting the affected-domestic-producer provision treats similarly situated
domestic producers differently); supra Part I.A.3.a (exploring the details of the
affected-domestic-producer provision).
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order.179 Some of USI’s domestic competitors that supported the original
antidumping petition are eligible for Byrd Amendment distributions.180 And
yet, because USI was not in existence at the time of the original petition, it is
deemed ineligible.181 Similarly, Giorgio Foods checked the “take no position”
box on the ITC questionnaire, although it did support the petition by other
means.182 Thus, Giorgio was deemed ineligible for Byrd money, while its
domestic competitors that did not provide as much support, but did check the
“support” box were eligible.183 Therefore, because challengers can easily
establish discrimination, the court must also consider whether there is any
legitimate purpose rationally related this injury.184
In determining a legitimate government purpose behind the Byrd
Amendment, the CIT could potentially repeat its finding from SKF I.185
According to the CIT in that case, congressional statements and
findings—when read in congruence with previous trade laws—indicate that the
Byrd Amendment was meant to assist the whole domestic industry in
recovering from unfair foreign-trade practices.186 In its analysis, the court
could highlight that the Byrd Amendment expands traditional trade-remedy
law, by seeking to remedy not only past harm to a domestic industry, but also
injury from continued dumping or subsidization past the date of an order’s
imposition.187 To promote this purpose, it follows that distributions under the
Byrd Amendment should be made to every member of an affected domestic
industry that claims injury due to continued dumping or subsidization—not
just those individual producers that happened to support the original order.
With this purpose in mind, the court must then ask if the discrimination
effectuated by the Byrd Amendment is rationally related to that purpose.188 In
USI’s case, the distinguishing factor that renders it ineligible for Byrd
Amendment distributions is its lack of existence at the time of the original

179. Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7.
180. Id. at 7–10.
181. Id. at 6–7.
182. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8, 13.
183. Id. at 2–5.
184. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the
existence of discrimination before turning to whether a legitimate basis existed under a
rational-basis review).
185. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1361 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006) (finding that the Byrd Amendment is not rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II),
556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
186. Id. at 1361–62.
187. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X,
§ 1002(3), 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 (2005).
188. See supra notes 111–25 and accompanying text (discussing the test for rational-basis
review).
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petition.189 In line with previous equal-protection jurisprudence, this arbitrary
distinction is irrational in relation to the overall purposes of the Byrd
Amendment, especially when read in conjunction with previous trade laws.190
In support of this conclusion, the CIT would have to look no further than the
Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Moreno—one of the few times the Court
has held that a law violates equal-protection principles under a rational-basis
review.191 In Moreno, the Court found that a later-in-time provision of the
Food Stamp Act that discriminated against the indigent population was
“clearly irrelevant” to the stated purposes of the Act in its entirety—to provide
relief to that particular subgroup.192 Likewise, the Byrd Amendment
discriminates against the very population that trade laws seek to protect and
compensate: injured domestic industries.193 By viewing the Byrd Amendment
as an amendment to these previous laws, the CIT could find that aiding certain
domestic producers that were in existence at the time of the original
petition—over other similarly situated domestic producers that were not in
existence—is in direct opposition to the overall purpose of those laws.194
Thus, the Byrd Amendment is not rationally related to this legitimate
government purpose, and so violates USI’s right to equal protection under a
rational-basis review.
The CIT could also look to the Federal Circuit’s holding in SKF II, which
determined that the Byrd Amendment’s legitimate purpose was to reward
parties who promoted the government’s policy interest in preventing
dumping.195 The Federal Circuit may have been averse to rewarding SKF
USA because SKF USA originally opposed the dumping petition, which had
been supported by other domestic producers.196 Unlike SKF USA, USI did not
exist at the time of the petition.197 Producers like USI, therefore, have an even
more compelling case than SKF USA—they never had the opportunity to
189. Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7.
190. SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (holding that reading the Byrd Amendment in
congruence with previous trade laws shows that discrimination was not rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)
(finding if a law is “[un]reasonable in light of its purpose,” it may be struck down under a
rational-basis review).
191. 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 679.
192. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–34.
193. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X, § 1002(3)(5),
114 Stat. 1549, 1549A72–73 (2000) (“[I]njurious dumping . . . which cause[s] injury to domestic
industries must be effectively neutralized . . . [therefore,] trade laws should [be] strengthened to
see that the remedial purpose of those laws is achieved.” (emphasis added)); SKF I, 451 F. Supp.
2d at 1363 (declaring that the Byrd Amendment’s classification was “not rationally connected” to
the purpose of assisting domestic industries).
194. See Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7.
195. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337, 1359–60 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1360; Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7.
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support the petition, much less “promote the government’s policy interest
against dumping.” Thus, the “reward” purpose has no bearing on producers
that were not yet in existence at the time the original petition was at issue.198
Because of this and other critical fact differences, the CIT could distinguish the
Federal Circuit’s holding in SKF, and find that the Byrd Amendment is a
violation of a future plaintiff’s right to equal protection under the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its repeal in 2006, the Byrd Amendment continues to attract
criticism for its international trade implications and constitutional effects.
Although the Federal Circuit found the Byrd Amendment survived a facial
constitutional challenge under free-speech and equal-protection challenges,
this should not foreclose future Byrd Amendment challenges. Rather, courts
should review the constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment as applied to each
new plaintiff. The Supreme Court’s recent preference for adjudicating
challenges as applied rather than facially in individual-rights litigation supports
this policy. Furthermore, significant factual differences between SKF USA
and future plaintiffs compel an individual assessment of constitutionality as
applied to the plaintiff’s particular circumstances. Therefore, despite facial
validity, a court reviewing an as-applied equal-protection claim could find the
Byrd Amendment unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s right to equal protection.

198. See SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360; Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7.

